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As world interest rates and the level of external debt rise and
terms of trade decline, a policy of import substitution begins to
make sense for a highly indebted country. At that point, it is in
the creditor's interests to grant some debt relief in exchange for
a higher export effort.
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Despite their productive inefficiencies, export  Important determinants in this choice are the
promotion and import substitution policies can  stck  of inherited foreign debt, the level of
improve welfare in a highly indebted country.  world interest rates, the terms of trade, and the
availability of profitable investment opportuni-
After all, the ultimate penalty facing default-  ties.
ing countries is exclusion from international
trade markets.  Export promotion can increase  Generally, a policy of export promotion is
available foreign financing, and import substitu-  best if the level of debt and interest rates are low
tion can rc4ucX  the debt service.  and the terms of trade are high.
Choosing between export promotion and  As these variables deteriorate - as a Korea
import substitution is a matter of determining  becomes s Peru - -the optimal strategy becomes
whether it is more profitable to increase the  import substitution. In those circumstances, it is
credit ceiling to borrow more - or to reduce the  in the creditor's interests to grant some debt
credit ceiling below inherited debt so there is  relief in exchange for a higher export effort.
less to repay.
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I.  Introduction
The  realization  of a series  of  negative  shocks  in  the
international  economy  has seriousely  affected  the  perceived  credit-
worthiness  of a number  of LDCs.  As a result,  new  loans  have  dried  up
and  the  debt  crisis  has  locked  creditor  groups  (commercial  banks  as
well  as  bilateral  lenders)  and  many  HICs in  a tough  bargaining
situation  over  the  amounts  of  debt  repayment  and  over  the  required
adjustments  in  their  economies  that  are  needed  to  make thosq  transfers
feasible.  This  has  re-opened  the  debate  on the  relative  merits  of
export  led  and  of import  substitution  led  growth.  The  purpose  of this
paper  is  to investigate  the  links  between  a country's  growth  and  debt
strategies  and  to  contrast  optimal  growth  strategies  before  and  after
a debt  crisis.
For  a  debtor  country  to service  a large  external  debt,  large
current  account  surpluses  are  needed.  But  besides  this  simple
identity,  a  more  subtle  link  between  trade  and  debt  strategies  arises
from  the  fact  that  the  gains  from  trade  serve  in  effect  as a
collateral  on a  country's  foreign  debt  . Over  time,  this  collateral  is
affected  by trade  policy  and  by the  sectoral  distribution  of
investment.  If a  country  is trying  to  regain  or increase  its  credit-
1  This  approch  is taken  in  Gersovitz  (1984).  Diwan  and  Donnenfeld  (1986),
BeLenzstein  and  Gosh (1988)  and  Aizenman  (1987).-3-
worthiness,  an export  promotion  strategy  (EP)  helps  because  it is
bound  to increase  the  gains  from  trade  and  therefore,  the  value  of the
collateral.  On the  other  hand,  a  country  that  is  trying  to  minimize
its  debt  repayments  can  do so  by reducing  its  trade,  i.e  by pursuing
an import  substitution  (IS)  led  growth  strategy.  By reducing  the  value
of its  collateral,  the  country  reduces  its  debt  repayment,  albeit  at
the  cost  of  a cut-off  of  new  loans.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to  analyze  the  determinants  of the
choice  by debtor  countries  of a  jointly  optimal  trade  and  debt
strategy  after  the  occurrence  of some  negative  shocks.  We find  that
the  optimal  response  involves  attempts  to increase  credit-worthiness
and  thus  ar.  EP strategy,  when the  shocks  are  not  too  large  and  when
profitable  investment  opportunities  would  be forgone  in the  absence  of
new  loans.  On the  other  hand,  large  negative  shocks  coupled  with  poor
investment  opportunities  can  lead  to  an optimal  strategy  of  withdrawal
from  international  markets  with  an IS emphasis.  Moreover,  interest
rate  and  terms  of trade  shocks  can  lead  to  a sudden  shift  in the
optimal  growth  strategy.
For  the  creditors  and  for  the  creditor  governments,  an IS
strategy  by the  debtor  is  sub-optimal.  We show  that  the  optimal
response  to  an IS strategy  involves  debt  write-offs  that  are  irtended
to provide  the  debtor  with  the  incentives  to  regain  its  credit-
worthiness.
The  analysis  is cast  in  terms  of credit  ceilings  and  their
dependance  on exogenous  variables  as  well  as on  variables  that  are
controlled  by the  debtor.  The  expected  present  value  of the  maximal-4-
net  transfers  that  a country  is  willing  to  effect  in the  future  in
order  to  escape  sanctions  represents  a ceiling  that  rational  lenders
try  not  to  exceed  in  order  to earn  profitable  returns  on their  loans.
While  the  threatened  penalties  are  hard  to ascertain,  mainly  because
they  are  seldom  used  given  the  superiority  of recontracting,  it is
widely  recognized  that  in  most  cases,  sanctions  will  involve  the
exclusion  from  some  international  trade  markets 2. The  realization  of a
series  of  negative  shocks  (interest  rate  increase,  terms  of trade
deterioration,  slow-down  of growth  in  the  industrial  world)  seems  to
have  raised  the  size  of  many  countries  foreign  liabilities  above  that
ceiling  (explaining  why  debt  trades  at a discount  in the  secondary
markets).  Debtor  countries  have  reacted  to the  financial  crunch  by
improving  their  current  account  balances.  But  as Table  1  shows,  some
countries  have  adjusted  by expanding  both  imports  and  exports  i.e  by
increasing  their  participation  in international  trade  while  others
chose  to adjust  with  a sharp  contraction  in imports,  with  little
increase  or even  a decrease  in  exports,  i.e  by reducing  their
participationin  trade.  In  this  paper,  we explain  those  different
responses  to the  shocks  of the  early  eighties  as rational  policy
choices  that  attempt  to  either  regain  credit-  worthiness  or to reduce
the  debt  burden.  We then  explore  the  determinants  of this  choice.
The  notion  that  economic  policy  could  be used  to  affect  the  debt
strategy  is  not  new.  A sizable  literature  has  analyzed  the  incentives
for  under-investment  in terms  of a "Debt  Laffer  Curve". 3 Other  papers
2  For  a good  discussion,  see  Kaletsky  (1985).
3  Sachs  (1988),  Krugman  (1987),  Froot  and  Al (1988),  Corden  (1988)-5-
have studied  the  benefit  of a  pre-committment  to  no-default  policies
in  a trade  context4.  This  paper  is  about .he  determinants  of the
optimal  choice  between  those  two  types  of (mutually  inconsistant)
strategies.  Moreover,  the  paper  develops  the  debt  overhang  argument  in
a trade  context.  Thus,  a central  result  of this  paper  is that  in the
absence  of an optimal  sectoral  investment  strategy  (or  of a resolution
of the  debt  crisis),  investment  will  be inefficiently  allocated
between  the  two  sectors.  A country  can  be made  better  off  by either
subsidizing  the  export  sector  in  order  to increase  the  amount  of  new
borrowings  or  by subsidizing  the  IS sector  in  order  to reduce  its  debt
repayment.  This  has  important  implications  both  for  the  understanding
of policy  choices  in  the  indebted  countries  as  well  as for  the
formulation  of solutions  to the  debt  crisis.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows:  In section  II,  a simple  two
periods  trade  model  under  certainty  is  set-up.  Section  III  analyzes
the  joint  optimal  debt  and  investment  strategies.  Section  IV  discusses
extensions.  Section  V discusses  the  welfare  concerns  and  section  V
conclut,  '.
II.  A two  periods  model  under  certainty.
II.1 The  analytical  set  up.
The simplest  set-up  needed  to  deal  with  the  problem  at  hand is  a
two  periods,  two  goods  model  of  a small  productive  economy  populated
4See  Gersovitz  (1984),  Diwan  and  Donnenfeld  (1986),  Aizenman  (1987),
Borensztein  and  Gosh  (1988).-6-
by a representative  agent  with  an inherited  international  liability.
The  focus  is on the  investment  decision  that  allocates  some  amount  of
capital 5 K  between  the  two  productive  sectors  in the  firat  period  t-l.
Foreign  borrowing  also  takes  place al  t-l  and  consumption,  trade  and
debt  repayment  takes  place  in the  second  period  t-2.  Presumably,  there
is  a government  in  charge  of foreign  borrowing  and  repayment
decisions.
Denote  the  exportable  good  by x and  the  importable  one  by m;
(X,M)  represent  domestic  output  while (x,m)  denote  the  consumption
vector.  The  international  prices  are  given  by (p,l),  with the
importable  price  normalized  to  unity.  If  no trade  occurs,  the  domestic
A 6 price  of the  exportable  is  given  by p  . We assume  through-out  that
A p <p,  i.e  that  if international  trade  occurs,  x is  indeed  exported  and
m is imported.
The  productive  structure  is  given  by two  neo-classical  concave
production  functions  that  use  capital  as the  only  input:
(1) X-f(Kx)-f(aK)  with  f'>O and  f"<O
(2) M=g(K,)-g((l-a)K)  with  g'>O  and  g"<O
(3) K-Kx+K.-KD+Dl
where  K  is  the  total  invested  capital,  KD is  an exogenously  given
amount  of  domestic  saving,  D1 is  borrowed  in t-1,  and (a)  is the
5  For  simplicity,  savings  are  held  constant.  Thus,  we do not  incorporate
debt  overhang  considerations.  Instead,  the  focus  is  on the  allocation  of
investment  between  the  two  sectors.  The  case  with  endogenous  savings  is
discussed  in section  IV.1.
In  this  setting,  this  is a  marginal  rate  of substitution  between  the
two  goods  ratler  than  a market  price.-7-
proportion  of total  capital  invested  in the  export  industry The
representative  agent's  preferences  for  consumption  are  given  by a
concave  utility  function  U(x,m).  We also  make  use  of the  expenditure
function  E(U,p)  (that  determines  the  smallest  income  that  can  achieve
a utility  level  U at  prices  p) and  of the  indirect  utility  function
V(I,p)  that  determines  the  maximum  utility  level  achievable  with  an
income  of I and  prices  p. I the  country's  income  evaluated  at  world
prices  :
(4)  I-pX+M
II.2  The repayment  decision.
Denote  by Do  the  country's  foreign  liability  at the  beginning  of
period  t-l,  by D1 the  amount  of  new  money  borrowed  in t-l  and  by D2
the  country's  total  liability  at the  end  of t-2  respectively.  For
simplicity,  we assume  that  all  loans  are  due  at the  end  of t-2  and
that  all  loans  carry  an interest  rate  of (R-1).  Thus  we have:
(5)  D2-(D,+D,)R
We now  analyze  the  repayment  decision  at time  t-2  and  we later
discuss  che  borrowing  decision  in  t=l.  Assume  that  the  repayment
decision  is  made  by a  central  planner  that  aims  at  maximizing  the
representative  agent  utility  in t-2.  Instead  of examining  cases  of
insolvency,  we  will instead  concentrate  the  analysis  on the  more
relevant  issue  of the  willingness  to  pay.  Thus,  assume  that  the-8-
planner  has the  option  of repaying  the  full  amount  due  D.  or  of
bargaining  with  the  country's  creditors  for  a  repayment  of  B. Since
renegotiating  is  an option  of -,he  planner,  the  option  will  be
exercised  only  when  B<D 2. Thus,  the imp'icit  form  of the  debt  contract
is  given  by a repayment  function  R of  he form:
(6)  R-min[B,D 2]
In general  B depends  on the  threat  points  and  the  bargaining
power  of  both the  debtor  and  its  creditors 7. The  debtor  can  threaten
to  default  completely  on the  loans.  The  creditors  can  threaten  to
impose  various  sanctions.  We  will assume  here  that  those  sanctions  are
trade  related,  and  for  analytical  tractability,  we take  the  sanction
to  be a  cut-off  of the  defaulting  debtor  from  some  international  trade
markets.  If  the  threat  is  credible,  a debtor  country  will  have to
consume  its  autarkic  allocation  (X,M)  in  the  event  of a default.  If D2
is  large  enough,  a debtor  may still  prefer  to default  and  loose  its
trade  option  rather  than  to repay  fully  its  international  debts.  But
such  a resolution  is  ex-post  inefficient  since  the  potential  gains
from  trade  are  then  lost.  Both  sides  of the  contract  can  end  up better
off  with  a  bargain.  Thus,  it  is  natural  to  assume  that  the  debt
contract  will  be renegotiated  and  that  sanctions  will  not  be imposed.
The  outcome  of this  is  a repayment  of B.
If  creditors  do not  gain  (or  lose)  from  the  sanctions,  they  would
accept  any  positive  repayment  in  exchange  for  a lifting  of the  trade
7A  discussion  of the  bargaining  process  is  in Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1986).-9-
sanctions.  On the  other  hand,  the  upper  bound  of the  transfer  that  a
debtor  is  willing  to  make to  avoid  sanctions,  BU,  is  given  by the
amount  of repayment  that  leaves  him indifferent  between  (i)  repaying
that  amount  and  engaging  in international  trade  (the  trade  mode)  and
(ii)  defaulting  and  consuming  his own  product  (the  autarkic  mode).  In
effect,  the  upper  bound  Bu  represents  the  valuation  by the  debtor  of
his  gains  from  trade,  or alternatively,  the  amount  of resources  that
the  debtor  is  willing  to give  out  in  order  to  retain  his  option  to
trade  in  the  international  goods  markets.  Formally:
(7) BU(K,a,p)-I-E[U(X,Y),p]
where  U(X,Y)  is the  autarkic  utility  level  and  E[U(X,Y),p]  is the
expenditure  needed  to achieve  :hat  utility  level  in the  trade  mode.
Thus,  I-E[.]  is the  maximum  income  that  is  given  out  to retain  the
trade  option.
The  relationship  in (7)  is  depicted  in  figure  1 in  the  two  goods
space.  The  available  stock  of investable  funds  K and  the  production
functions  determine  the  production  possibility  curve  FF.  The
investment  mix (a)  determine  the  production  vector  depicted  as  P. The
indifferance  curve  AA that  passes  through  P represents  the  autarkic
level  of  utility  given  K and  a.  The  maximv1i  repayment  By  that  the
country  is  willing  to  make in  order  to  preserve  its  trade  option
leaves  the  country  on the  indifference  curve  AA but  allows  it to
consume  the  vector  C.  The  distance  between  the  budget  lines  (at  prices
p) that  go through  P and  C determine  Bu.-10-
We generally  expect  that  B is  bounded  below  by zero  and  above  by
BU,  the  debtor's  gains  from  trade,  with the  exact  amount  determined  by
bargaining.  However  and  for  simplicity,  we take  B(K,a,p)-BU(K,a,p).
This  assumes  that  the  creditors  coalition  is  in a  monopoly  situation
in  the  sense  that  it  can  extract  all  the  borrower's  surplus. 8
Finally,  note  that  although  B is the  repayment  that  leaves  the  country
indifferent  between  defaulting  (and  not trading)  and  repaying  (and
trading),  when such  a choice  is  available,  we will  assume  that  the
country  prefers  to repay  B and  to trade  rather  than  to  default  and  not
9 trade
[figure  1]
II.3  Credit  ceiling. -
In t-l,  competitive  creditors  are  willing  to  advance  a loan  D,  if
they  expect  to earn  with  certainty  a return  equal  to their  cost  of
capital  R  10.  Assume  that  the  country  can  commit  itself  to  some
investment  mix (a)  before  the  lenders  make  a loan  and  that  all  the
investable  capital  K  has to  be invested  after  the  new  loan  is  made' 1.
Moreover,  assume  for  now that  the  inherited  debt  Do  is zero.  For  a
large  enough  loan,  the  contractual  repayment  DIR can  get  larger  than
8  A discussion  of the  more  general  case  with  bargaining  is in  section
IV.2.  The  results  are  essentially  similar.
This  does  not  entail  any  loss  of generality  since  the  country  can  be
made to strictly  prefer  the  trade  regime  if it is  required  to repay  (B-e)
with E>0  and infinitely  small.
10 This  is due  to  certainty.  With  uncertainty,  risk  neutral  and
competitive  lenders  advance  new  loans  when  the  expected  return  on the
loans  is  at least  equal  to their  cost  of capital.  The  effect  of
uncertainty  on the  model  is  discussed  in  IV.4.
11  The  possibility  of precomitting  the  investment  mix  and  the  time
inconsistency  problems  are  discussed  in  IV.3.-11-
the  gains  from  trade  B(D,+K,a,p)  that  represent  the  largest  repayment
a  country  will  be willing  to  make.  In that  case,  the  creditors  can
rationally  expect  the  debtor  to  renegotiate  his loan  in  the  future  in
order  to limit  his  repayment  to  his  gains  from  trade  B(.)  and  the  loan
will  not  be profitable.
What is  the  maximum  amount  of capital  that  the  creditors  can
safely  lend  in t-l?  First,  we note  that  this  is  a positive  amount
since  the  gains  from  trade  are  always  positive.  With  no inherited
debt,  the  largest  safe  loan  Dw  is  then  given  by the  loan  size  that
makes  the  debtor  indifferent  between  repaying  its  gains  from  rade
B(D4"+K,a,p)  and  the  contractual  repayment  . D^A.  Thus,  the  credit
ceiling  in t-l  solves:
(8)  DMAX(a,p)-  Bm"(a,p)/9-  B(KP+d"2,a,p)/OF
This  is illustrated  in  figure  2 that  depicts  the  shape  of the
gains  from  trade  function  B in  relation  to  the  size  of the  loan  D 12.
For  D  below  D'AX,  the  loan  is safe  since  the  gains  from  trade  exceed
the  required  repayment  DRO.  However,  above  DAx, the  couLtry  will repay
its  gains  from  trade  B that  are  below  the  required  DR.
Note that  the  credit  ceiling  is  large  when the  gains  from  trade
are  large.  Intuitively,  this  is  becausa  large  gains  from  trade  are
valuable  to the  debtor  and  thus,  he  will  be  willing  to effect  large
transfers  as  debt  service  in  order  to  protect  his  option  to trade  in
12  B(D) is  generally  concave  because  of the  concavity  of the  production
function.  See  the  appendix  for  a discussion.-12-
the  international  goods  markets.  On the  other  hand,  a  cour.try  that  is
less  dependent  on trade  is less  dependable;  it  will  pay less  to  be
able  to trade  and its  credit  ceiling  will  be low..
[figure  2]
II.4 New  borrowings.
With some  inherited  debt,  we assume  that  the  new  loan  will  be
repaid  according  to the  contractual  schedule  only  when the  inherited
debt is  also  repaid  fully' 3. Thus,  a  new  loan  can  be profitably
advanced  only  if  the  inherited  debt  Do  is  below  Lhe  credit  ceiling
DW.  Mo-reover,  the  maximal  amount  of  net  lending  in t-l,  we call  it
from  now  on D.  ,  is dependant  on the  amount  of inherited  loans  Do.  We
have:
(9)  Di  < D  MA-  Max (DM'-D 0,O)
It can  be shown  (see  appendix  for  the  proof)  that:
Proposition  1:
D"  is increasing  in  p and  in  KP  and  d creasing  in  R
Intuitively,  an increase  in the  terms  of trade  p increases  the
gains  from  trade  and  thus,  the  amount  that  the  debtor  is  willing  to
13  That is,  we are  assuming  that  new  loans  are  not  senior  to the  old
loans.-13-
pay  in  order  to retain  the  trade  option.  Moreover,  when discounted  at
a  higher  interest  rate  RF,  the  maximum  repayment  Bm  translates  into  a
lower  credit  ceiling.  Finally,  an increase  in  domestic  savings  expands
investment,  trade  and  thus,  it increases  the  gains  from  trade.
We define  a situation  in  which  the  inherited  debt  is above  the
credit  ceiling  as a debt  overhang.1 4 In a debt  overhang,  no new
lending  is  forthcoming  and  there  is  partial  default  on inherited  debt.
On the  othor  hand,  credit-worthy  countries  that  can  get  new loans  are
expected  to  fully  repay  their  debts  according  to schedule.
1I.5 Decentralized  investment.
The investment  decision  is taken  in t-l.  There  are  two  aspects  to
it:  the  amount  of the  investable  capital  K (which  depends  on the
amount  of the  new  loans,  if  any)  and  the  allocation  of K  between  the
two  productive  sectors.  In  this  section,  assume  that  the  sectoral
allocation  is  arbitrated  by a credit  market  that  is free  of government
distortions.  If the  government  borrows  abroad,  it  must  distribute  the
new loans  to the  private  sector  through  a  market  mechanism  and the
gains  (or  losses)  are  passed  to the  consumers  in t-2  in  the  form  of a
subsidy  (or  a tax).  In  such  an  economy,  the  sectoral  allocation  of
capital  is  determined  by profit  maximization  and  is independant  of the
debt  strategy.  In  equilibrium,  and  for  every  level  of investable
14  In a  world  of  uncertainty,  the  credit  ceiling  is given  by the
discounted  expected  maximum  repayments.  Thus,  it  will  depend  on the  whole
probability  distributions  of  p and  Re.  The  realization  of low  terms  of
trade  and  high  interest  rates  in  the  early  eighties  must  have lowered  tnat
ceiling.  Later,  we  use  this  interpretation  to  argue  that  in  many
instances,  the  stock  of  inherited  debt  does  indeed  exeed  the  credit
ceiling..14-
capital  K, the  optimal  free  trade  investment  mix  aF  maximizes  income  I
and  is given  by the  usual  marginal  condition:
(10)  pf'l[apK]  - g'[(l-aF)K]
where  (')  denotes  derivatives  with  respect  to  K. This,  together  with  K
determine  the  optimal  free  trade  production  vector  (X!,MW)  as  well as
the  free  trade  credit  ceiling  D  2(a ,p).  Moreover.  it is  easy  to  show
that  aF  and  X  increase  in  p  while  If  decreases  in  p.
III.  Optimal  intervention.
Would  a central  planner  choose  the  investment  mix  aF?  In our
setting  this  is  not  always  the  case.  Of course,  any  deviations  from
that  rule  will  reduce  income  if  new  borrowing  and  debt  repayment  are
kept  constant.  However,  the  choice  of an investment  mix  can  have  an
important  impact  on  both the  availability  of  new lending  as  well  as on
the  amount  of debt  repayment  because  it  affects  the  gains  from  trade.
Sometimes,  these  externalities  are  large  enough  to offset  the
productive  efficiency  loss  of intervention.
For  example,  very  profitable  investment  opportunities  are
available  but  cannot  be undertaken  because  of a lack  of capital.  In
this  case,  it  might  be welfare  improving  to  shift  the  investment  mix
towards  the  export  sector  if  this  increased  the  credit  ceiling.  The
loss  in  productive  efficiency  would  be more  than  compensated  by an
increase  in  the  scale  of production.  Alternatively,  if the  burden  of-15-
inherited  debt  is quite  heavy  and  profitable  projects  are  scarce,  it
might  be profitable  to shift  the  investment  mix towards  the  IS  sector
in  order  to reduce  the  country's  reliance  on trade  and  the  debt
burden.  The  saving  in  debt  service  might  more  than  offset  the  loss  in
productive  efficiency
In this  section,  we analyze  the  planner's  joint  optimal  debt  and
investment  strategies  and  discuss  the  factors  that  affect  the
interactions  between  these  two  concerns.  When  the  optimal  investment
mix  is different  from  the  decentralized  one,  trade  policy  is  welfare
improving.  It is important  to  note  that  in  a decentralized  economy,  a
departure  from  ap  cannot  be achieved  by an exchange  rate  policy  but
rather  with subsidies  to the  export  sector  and  with taxes  on the
import  competing  sector
III.1  Trade  policy,  repayment  and  credit  ceiling.
It  can  be sr.own  (see  the  appendix)  that  the  gains  from  trade
function  B(K,a,p)  as  well  as the  credit  ceiling  Dm"(a,p)  are  well
defined  functions  that  increases  in (a),  the  proportion  of capital
invested  in the  export  sector  in  the  range  [aF,ll.  The intuition  is
simple:  as  more  gets  invested  in the  export  sector,  the  country  will
increase  its  gains  from  trade  (but  at a  decreasing  rate).
The  debt  repayment  and  the  credit  ceiling  are  minimized  with the
choice  of an investment  mix  a&  that  minimizes  the  gains  from  trade.
This is  achieved  with  a  production  mix  that  is  as desirable  for
15  This  can  take  the  form  of differential  income  taxes,  of different
interest  rates  charged  on loans  by government  agencies,  or of trade
related  taxes.-16-
autarkic  consumption  purposes  as the  preferred  trade  allocation.  Using
equations  (7)  and (8),  it  is  possible  to show  that  there  exist  a  mix
aA that  reduces  the  debt  repayment  and  the  gains  from  trade  to  zero.
This investment  mix  that  determines  the  most extreme.  form  of IS
strategy  that  the  debtor  country  could  follow  is given,  at  every  level
of available  capital  K,  by:
(11)  e-Ux[f(aK),g(l-aA)K]/Um[f(aAK),g(I-aA)K]-p
It is  easy  to  verify  from  equations  (10)  and (11)  that  because
p (a  )<p,  it  must  be that  a  <aF.  Also  note  that  generally,  aA  does  not
maximize  the  autarkic  utility  level  U(X(a,K),M(a,K)).
Collecting  our  results,  we  have:
Proposition  2:
a)  A subsidy  to  the  export  sector  increases  the  credit  ceiling
and  the  maximum  credit  ceiling  is  bounded  by D^m(l,p).
b) A subsidy  to the  import  competing  sector  reduces  the  maximum
future  repayment  which  is zero  at a-aA
III.2  Optimal  trade  and  debt  policies.
The  country  can  thus,  by changing  the  private  incentive  for
investment  in the  two  sectors  either  (i)  increase  its  borrowing  above
its  normal  credit  ceiling  by precomitting  itself  to larger  future
repayment  or (ii)  reduce  its  future  repayment  by essentially
producing  a production  mix that  fits  its  consumption  preferences-17-
better.  In  both situations,  the  country  trades  off  productive
efficiency  losses  with  gains  on the  debt  front.  The  preferred
strategy  will  generally  depend  on the  country's  stock  of inherited
debt  Dot  on the  expected  terms  of trade,  on the  marginal  productivity
of capital  in t-l  and  on the  world's  interest  rate  Re.  Intuitively,
the  larger  the  inherited  debt,  the  more is  the  country  interested  in
IS as a  means  of reducing  future  debt  service;  this  tendency  is
reinforced  if  the  marginal  return  on capital  (and  thus  on  new
borrowing)  is  low  either  because  of the  exhaution  of profitable
projects  or because  of low  terms  of trade.  Finally,  the  higher  RF,
the  less  is it interesting  to  borrow  and  the  more is it  profitable  to
try  to reduce  future  repayments.  We now  make  those  claims  more
precise.
III.2.a  The  planner's  program.
Formally,  the  problem  of the  social  planner  is  to  choose  the
size  of the  new  loan  D1* and  an investment  mix  a* that  solves:
Max  V(I-R,p) under  the  constraint  in (9)
Since  p is  exogenous  the  problem  simplifies  to a simple  net
income  (NI)  maximization  problem  by virtue  of the  separation
principle:
(12) Find (D,*,a*)  that  maximize  NI-(I-R)  subJect  to  the  constraint
in (9).-18-
III.2.b  Solutions.
The  optimal  solutions  to  the  program  in (12)  depend  on the  level
of the  exogenous  variable.  as  well as  on the  functional  forms  of the
utility  and  production  functions.  It is  useful  to  classify  them
according  to  whether  the  credit  ceiling  is,  or is  not  binding  when
there  is  no trade  policy,  i.e  when  a-ap.
Xi)  D*(ap,p)  < DW2(ap,p) :
When the  credit  constraint  is  not  binding  at a-a  ,  investment  is
not  constrained  by liquidity  considerations.  In  that  case,  no trade
policy  must  be a local  optimum,  that  is,  a*-ap  must  be a local
extremum.  To see  why,  we show  that  a  marginal  movement  of (a)  on
either  side  of  aF  will  reduce  net income.  Figure  3 illustrates  that
case.
At the  margin,  favoring  either  the  export  or the  IS sectors  will
respectively  increase  or reduce  the  credit  ceiling  but  would  leave
the  optimal  borrowing  below  the  credit  ceiling  and  the  debt  repayment
equal  to its  contractual  value.  Therefore,  the  only  effect  of a
marginal  trade  policy  is to  generate  inefficiencies  in  production  and
thus,  net  income  will  fall.  This  extremum  [Dl*<DMA  ;a*-aF]  at  point
A3 can  arise  when investment  is  not  very  profitable  at the  margin,
when  the  interest  rate  R  is  large,  when  the  stock  of  domestic
capital  KD is  large,  and  when inherited  debt  is  low.
Although a no trade policy is in that case a local  extremum,
there  can  also  exist  another  extremum  with trade  policy  and  a  binding-19-
credit  ceiling.  This  extrema  cannot  involve  EP [a>aF]  but could
possibly  involve  ar.  IS  policy  [a<aF].  To see  that,  consider  first  a
finite  and  positive  movement  of (a)  away  from  aF  (EP).  With  no
increase  in  borrowing,  the  export  sector  expands  and  its  marginal
productivity  falls  below  RF,  and  the  import  sector  shrinks  with its
marginal  productivity  above  RF.  The  credit  ceiling  also  expands  and
new  borrowings  can  be used  to  bring  back the  import  sector  to its
original  size  with  its  marginal  productivity  of capital  equal  to the
interest  rate  R!.  But  at this  point,  the  export  sector  is  producing
inefficiently  and  is  making  a loss  given  the  cost  of  capital.  Thus,
this  type  of policy  cannot  increase  net income.
However,  another  extremum  with IS  might  exist.  This  is  because
with enough  IS [(a)  small  enough  and  below  aJ],  the  credit  ceiling
falls  below  the  inherited  debt  Do (at  point  C3). The  movement  in (a)
that  is required  to reach  that  ceiling,  and  thus,  the  amount  of
production  inefficiencies  required,  depends  principally  on the  amount
of inherited  debt.  From  this  point  on,  as (a)  decreases,  the  debt
repayment  goes  down.  At the  margin,  the  productivity  of a dollar  of
capital  in the  export  sector  is  above  RF  while  it is less  than  RF  in
the  import  sector.  A local  e'ctremum  will exist  (at  point  G3) if at
some  (a),  the  total  reduction  in the  repayment  is large  enough  to
offset  the  loss  in  the  import  sector  and  the  opportunity  loss  in  the
export  sector.  Otherwise,  the  net  income  function  is  represented  at
the  left  of  C3 by the  branch  C3E.
Moreover,  this  extremum  could  produce  an  overall  net income
above  the  no trade  policy  case  when  Dl*(ap,p)  is  small.  For  example,-20-
if it is locally optimal not to take any new loan in t=l without
trade policy, if inherited debt is large and close to the no trade
policy credit ceiling, and if  production distortions  have a small
inefficiency cost but a large effect on the gains from trade, then an
import subsitution extremum will exist and it will dominate the free
trade extremum.
[figure  3]
(ii)  D*(a ,p)  DM"  (a ,p)
If the credit ceiling is  binding when there is no trade policy,
the marginal return of capital is above the cost of capital in both
sectors: investment is thus liquidity constrained. In this case, no
trade policy cannot be an optimal strategy, i.e a* is necessarily
different from aF.  To see that, we need to consider the two possible
cases of a binding credit ceiling  with no trade policy: either the
credit ceiling is  below the inherited  debt and there is some new
lending, or it is below D0 and there is nc new lending.
In the first case [DO>D  A(aF,p)-D*(aF,p)]  illustrated in figure
4, income can be increased  with a marginal policy of EP. This is
because such a marginal move will increase the credit ceiling and
thus, it  will trade off inefficiency  losses (close  to zero at a )  for
a gain in the scale of production (larger than zero with a binding
ceiling). Thus, the slope of the net income function at point A4 is
positive. Net income  must reach a maximum at some (a) satisfying
aF<a<l (as in  point B4) because of decreasing return in production.Moreover, there can exist another extremum involving IS. This is
beeause a large enough shift in (a)  below aF  reduces the credit
ceiling to a level below the inherited debt (at  point C4 ).  From that
point on, a further reduction in (a)  reduces both the debt repayment
and productive efficiency. Income increases when the first effect
dominates, and an extremum involving IS will then exist (G 4 on the
branch C4D). Otherwise, there is no such extremum (branch C4E).
FA  F In the second case [D0<D  (a  ,p)-D*(a  ,p)] depicted in figure 5,
a  marginal policy of IS will increase income because it trades off
some inefficiencies in production (close to zero at a  F) for a
reduction in the credit ceiling further  below DO' thus leading to a
fall in the debt repayment. Therefore, the slope of the net income
function at point A5 is negative. An extremum at some (a)  satisfying
aA<a<aF  will necessarily exist (as  at point B5). Moreover, another
extremum involving EP might also exist. A large enough shift in (a)
above aF  will increase the credit ceiling sufficiently to make new
loans possible (at  point C.).  From that point on, as (a) increases,
new lending as well as productive inefficiencies increase. When the
first effect dominates, an extremum involving EP will exist (on the
branch C5D). Collecting the results, we have:
Proposition 3: Local and global optima
F
a) When investment is not liquidity constrained at a ,  either (i)
a*=aF (no trade policy) or (ii) a*<aF  with D1*=O (IS  with no new
borrowing), or both.
b) When investment is liquidity constrained at aF,  the optimal
trade and debt strategy is either (i) a*>aF  and Dl*>O (EP  with-22-
positive new borrowing) or (ii)  a*<aF  and Dl*-O (IS  with no new
borrowing), or both.
c) In both (a) and (b), the global optimum can be either of the
two  extrema,  depending  on the  size  of the  inherited  debt,  the
relative  intensity  of capital  in the  two  productions  functions
and the relative intensity of the gains fiom trade in the two
goods.
[figures  4  and 5]
III.2.c  Comparative statics.
Finally,  we do  some  comparative  statics  and  show  that  exogenous
shocks  (changes  in  D.,  RF ,p)  can  produce  a  change  in the  optimal
regime,  x.e  a continuous  change  in  any  one  of the  exogenous  variables
can produce a large and discontinuous  change in a*. In effect, the
local extrema are affected and the global maximum can shift from one
of the possible extrema to another.
(i)  Changes  in  Do  and  in  R:
Proposition 4:
When  no trade  policy  is  optimal,  a large  enough  increase  in  DoRe
makes  EP  become  globally  optimal.  With  further  increases  in  DoRF,
a fix  level  of IS  becomes  globally  optimal.
To see what is going on, consider the effect of a marginal
increase in DoR  on net income in each of the three possible extrema.-23-
In all cases, we know that the ceiling on new borrowings D1 i
decreases:
(i) If the credit ceiling is not binding and thus, a*=aF,  NI
decreases as debt and its  burden increase.  Moreover, the credit
ceiling D1 iM  is decreasing  and at some DoRF,  it catches up with D1*.
At that point, investment  becomes liquidity constrained  and this
optimum disappears and is replaced with an optimum involving  EP
(since  at this point, a marginal increase in (a) above aF is costless
in terms of efficiency  but increases the ceiling).
(ii) If the credit ceiling is binding with Dl*>O,  we know that a*>aF
(i.e,  EP is optimal). NI decreases on two accounts: the debt burden
increases an; the debt ceiling as well as the size of the new
borrowings decreases. (Moreover,  new loans are more expensive in the
case of a rise in R).  The country reacts by altering its optimal a*.
When the production functions are concave enough, the loss of
liquidity is  very costly and the country reacts by increasing a* in
an attempt to reduce the fall in  Di*.  At some point, the increase in
DoR and the decrease in  NI are so large that the global optimum
shifts to an IS strategy.
(iii)  If the credit ceiling is  binding with D1*=O, we know that
a*<aF (i.e, IS is optimal). There is no new borrowing and the
repayment is given  by the gains from trade B(.). An increase in DoR
has therefore  no effect on NI and on a*. This also explains why the
EP strategy  (that  yields  a NI that  is  decreasing  in  DoRF)  will
necessarily get dominated  by an IS strategy for a large enough fall
in  DoR.-24-
(ii)  Changes  in  p, the  terms  of trade.
Proposition  5:
For  a large  enough  p, free  trade  is optimal.  For  a large  enough
reductior.s  in  p, EP  becomes  globally  optimal.  A further  large
enough  reduction  in  p makes  IS  globally  optimal.
Terms  of trade  changes  are  slightly  more  difficult  to  analyze
because  they  affect  both the  ciudit  ceiling  (Proposition  1) and  the
free  trade  optimal  investment  mix  a . Therefore,  the  three  possible
extrema  are  affected.  Consider  the  effect  on  each  extrema  of a
deterioration  in  p:
(i)  For  p large  enough,  the  gains  from  traie  are  so large  that  the
credit  ceiling  exceeds  inherited  debt  plus  the  demanded  new  loans.  In
that  case,  there  is  no need  to  distort  investment  and  free  trade  is
optimal.  As p decreases,  investment  is shifted  from  the  export  to  the
import  sector  and  NI falls.  The fall  in  the  credit  ceiling  B(a,p)  is
due  to the  reduction  in  both the  terms  of trade  and  of  aW.  When  the
credit  ceiling  becomes  binding 18, the  free  trade  extremum  disappears
and  is  replaced  by an extremum  involving  EP as the  country  attempts
to increase  its  borrowings.
(ii)  When EP is  optimal.  A fall  in  p reduces  new  borrowings  and  the
marginal  productivity  of  the  export  sector.  Thus,  NI falls  on  both
16  This  assumes  that  the  demand  for  capital  falls  less  than  the  ceiling.
Otherwise,  the  economy  is  stuck  to  this  extremum  until  a  jump to the  IS
extremum  becomes  profitable.-25-
accounts.  If the  credit  ceiling  remains  binding,  the  EP effort  is
reduced  because  the  marginal  distortion  becomes  more  costly.  A large
enough  fall  in  p induces  then  a shift  in  the  optimal  regime  to IS. 17
(iii)  When  IS is optimal.  A fall  in  p reduces  the  gains  from  trade
and  thus  the  debt  repayment  and  NI Increases  on this  account.
However,  NI is  reduced  by the  direct  effect.  Overall,  NI goes  down
but the  optimal  (a)  is  not  affected.  Moreover,  the  reduction  in  NI is
less  marked  than  in the  EP case.  Thus,  and  starting  with  an EP
strategy,  IS  becomes  optimal  for  a large  enough  fall  in  p.
IV.  Extensions  of the  model.
Admittedly,  the  model  presented  above  is  a  highly  stylized
simplification  of a complex  world.  In this  section,  we discuss  how
our  results  are  affected  if some  of the  assumptions  are  released.
IV.1 Endogenous  savings.
How  would  domestic  savings  be determined  by a  planner  if  he
controlled  them  in  addition  to  his  controlling  (a)  and  Dl.  In  order
to answer  that,  we need  to  analyze  the  effect  of an increase  in
domestic  capital  KP  on the  gains  from  trade  B and  on the  credit
ceiling  Dma. In  general,  it is  possible  to  show  that  B(.)  is
increasing  (concave)  in  K . This  imply  that  in  general,  the  planner
can  increase  social  welfare  if  he controlled  domestic  savings  in
17  However,  if the  credit  ceiling  is  not  binding  anymore  because  of a
more  pronounced  fall  in the  demand  for  capital,  a*  becomes  optimal  before
a further  reduction  in  p makes  IS globally  optimal.-26-
addition  to the  investment  mix.  In  particular,  when the  optimal
strategy  is to  reduce  the  debt  repayment  (IS),  the  use  of two  control
variables  (savings  and  the  investment  mix)  allows  the  planner  to get
the  same  debt  repayment  (gains  from  trade)  with  less  inefficiencies
in  production  (less  IS)  in  exchange  for  some  inefficiencies  in the
intertemporal  allocation  of resources.  This  is  achieved  by reducing
(taxing)  savings.  However,  when  the  optimal  policy  is to increase  the
credit  ceiling  (EP),  an increase  in savings  can  help.  Finally,  if  the
optimal  policy  is  no intervention,  there  is  no reason  to subsidize  or
tax  saving.
Those  results  somehow  confirm  the  predictions  of single  good
models  of the  debt  overhang.  In those  models,  a reduction  in  savings
reduces  the  debt  repayment  because  they  reduce  future  output.  In our
model,  a  debt  overhang  can  lead  to attempts  to reduce  the  repayment.
In  that  case,  an IS  policy  and  a decrease  in saving  from  the  laissez-
faire  allocation  increases  welfare.
Proposition  6: In general,  it is  optimal  to tax  savings  when IS
is  globally  optimal  and  to subsidize  them  when  EP is globally
optimal.
IV.2 Bargaining.
If  BU<B<O,  the  question  is  whether  B is  a stable  function  of Bl.
The  bargaining  literature  has  not  yet  resolved  this  issue  in  general
circumstances.  However,  the  Nash  bargaining  solution  and its
Rubinstein  interpretation,  give  rise  to  payoff  functions  that  are-27-
linear  in  the  threat  points.  Since  (I-BU)  can  be interpreted  as the
threat  point  of the  creditors,  B is indeed  linear  in Bu  in  that  case.
IV.3 Commitment  and  investment  reversals.
If  there  are  no costs  for  reversing  investment,  commitments  to
increase  export  in the  future  in  exchange  for  new  loans  today  will
not  be credible.  Instead,  creditors  can  rationally  expect  countries
to  do  what is in their  ex-post  interest  and  in  particular,  to  avoid
distorting  investment  once  the  loans  have  been  disbursed.  Morever,  IS
strategies  will  be expected  to  be used  to reduce  repayments.  These
considerations  explain  the  difficulty  of  using  EP strategies  when it
is in  the  ex-ante  interest  of countries  to do  so.  In the  absence  of  a
commitment  mechanism,  EP strategies  can  be made  credible  and  thus
used  when  investment  reversals  are  costly  and  when a country  succeeds
over  time  in  developing  a credible  reputation.  In general,  this  adds
to the  costs  involved  in attempts  to  regain  credit-worthiness.
Multilateral  institutions  can  help  in the  resolution  of this  time
inconsistency  problem  by lending  on a  conditional  basis  and  by
developing  a close  relation  with  domestic  policy-makers.  In general,
their  inmolvement  can  signal  that  the  country  is  trying  to regain
credit-worthiness.
V. Welfare  considerations.
V.1  Creditors  optimal  strategies.
When inherited  debt  is  so large  that  it  is optimal  for  a  country
to follow  an IS strategy,  the  creditors  strategy  of  holding  on to-28-
their  claims  in  not optimal.  Instead,  their  attempts  to  collect  a
large  debt  leads  to the  provision  of incentives  in the  debtor  country
for inefficient  investment  and  saving  behaviors  and  thus  to smaller
repayments.  In  a  world  of  certainty,  a large  enough  reduction  in  D.
in  the  form  of a debt  write-off  will induce  in  the  debtor  country  a
more  efficient  production  structure  as  well as  a larger  debt
repayment.  In a  world  of  uncertainty,  contingent  debt  relief  will
also  achieve  this  aim.  However,  creditors  may  be  unwilling  to  grant
uncontingent  debt  relief  in  view  of the  possibilities  of good  shocks
in  the  future  that  will increase  the  credit  ceiling  sufficiently  to
make  an IS strategy  sub-optimal  for  the  debtor' 8. If this  view is
accepted,  a resolution  of the  debt  crisis  presupposes  more  complex
financial  recontracting  than  that  observed  today.
Proposition  7:  When IS is  globally  optimal,  it is in the  interest
of creditors  to  grant  debt  relief.
V.2  World  %ficiency considerations.
In the  case  of a small  debtor  trading  with  a large  creditor,  the
interest  of the  creditor  country  is  the  same  as that  oi the  creditor
banks.  If the  creditor  group  is  not  coordinated  enough  to  give  relief
when it is  profitable  to the  group,  there  is  room  for  policy
intervention.  The  problem  is  that  the  possibility  of intervention  can
maKe it  strategically  superior  for  the  creditor  group  to  hold  out  on
18  For  a discussion  of other  reasons  why  creditors  do not  give  relief,
see  Feldstein  and  al (1987)-29-
debt  relief  in  an attempt  to extract  some  bribe  from  their
government,  at least  in the  bad states  of  nature.  In this  event,  a
binding  commitment  not  to interfere  might  give  the  creditors  group  a
stronger  interest  in  granting  relief.  Regulatory  changes  can  also
help (as  those  that  encourage  small  banks  to  pull  out).
But there  are  other  reasons  why governments  may  want  to
interfere  and  those  are  essentially  trade  reasons.  Even  with small
countries,  the  creditors  government  policy  stand  towards  the  debt
crisis  matters  in terms  of trade  because  as a group,  the  debtors  form
a large  trading  bloc.  Creditors  governments  might  have  an interest  in
intervention  either  to  encourage  trade  (acting  in the  interests  of
consumers,  export  producers  or of efficiency)  or to  discourage  trade
(to  protect  import  competing  sectors).  They  can  achieve  the  first
goal  by various  means  including  a debt  facility  or by an indirect
involvement  through  conditional  lending  by the  multilateral
organizations.  They  can  achieve  the  second  goal  by doing  nothing  and
letting  the  crisis  deteriorate  (or  even  put  pressure  on the  banks  so
that  they  do  not give  relief).
V.  Concluding  remarks.
We have  argued  that  for  countries  with a  binding  credit  ceiling,
a  policy  of trade  intervention  necessarily  increases  welfare.  The
choice  between  EP and  IS depends  on  whether  it is  more  profitable  to
try  to increase  the  credit  ceiling  in  order  to  borrow  more,  or to
reduce  the  credit  ceiling  below  inherited  debt  in  order  to  repay-30-
less.  The  important  determinants  of this  choice  of  a  joint  trade  and
debt  strategy  are  the  stock  of inherited  foreign  debt,  the  level  of
the  world  interest  rate,  and  the  terms  of trade.  Generally,  EP is
more  profitable  with  a low  inherited  debt,  a low  interest  rate  and
high  terms  of trade.  As these  variables  deteriorate,  the  optimal
strategy  can  jump  to IS.  Thus,  a  Korea  could  suddenly  turn  into  a
Peru.  In this  case,  it is  optimal  for  the  creditors  coalition  to
grant  debt  relief.
.-31-
Appendix  of  proofs.
1.  The  model.
The  country's  objective  is to  choose  (a*,D,*)  that  maximize  net
income  (I-R)  with
(4)  I(K,a,p)-pX+M
(1) X(K,a)-f(aK)  with f'>O and  fn<O
(2) M(K,a)-g((l-a)K) with  g'>O and  g"<O
(3) K-KP+D 1
(6) R-min[B,D 2]
(5)  D2 -(DO+D 1 )R
(9)  Di  < DI'  - Max (DfD-DOMO)
(8) DA(KP,a,p)-  BMAX  (KP,a,p)/R,-  B(K+DIMA  ,a,p)/Rl
(7) B(K,a,p)-I-E[U(X,Y),p]
2.  Credit  ceiling.
2.a.  Existence. The  credit  ceiling  Dmx is  defined  in  equation  (8)
and  exists  whenever  that  equation  has  a solution.  Using (7),  we have
to  show  that:
(Al)  3  Dm  s.t  D"  RF  - I(KD+D 1MLX,a,p)-E(UA,p)
for  all  ae[O,l]  and  p>pA
with  UA-  U[X(a,RP+DMX),M(a,KF+DlmX)]
When  Do  is  very  large,  DMA  -0 and  DPW-B(KP,a,p)  which  is  hounded.  On
the  other  hand,  when  DO-O,  D~"-D 1^A,  and  it is  possible  to show  that-32-
a fix  point  Di"  that  solves  (Al)  exists:  since  the  LHS  of the
equation  increases  in  D1 at the  rate  of  RF,  a sufficient  condition
for  the  existence  of a fixed  point  is that  the  RHS (i)  be positive  at
D1-O  and (ii)  concave  in  D1. (see  figure  1)
(i)  for  all  D1>O,  B>O  when  p>pA  since  VT(D-O)>Uh(D-0)l 9 implying  that
the  expenditure  needed  to reach  UA  at  price  p is lower  than  I, the
income  under  the  trade  regime.
(ii)  Concavity  of B:  differentiating  (7)  with  respect  to D 1, and
using  the  fact  that,  because  of the  price  normalization,  the  marginal
utility  of the  second  good  UM  is  equal  to the  marginal  utility  of
income,  we get:
(A2)  OB/8D 1-apf'+(l-a)g'-(OE/8U  )[Uxf'a+Umg'(1-a)]
-apf'+(l-a)g'-[pAfDa+gD(l-a)]
-(p-p  )f'a>O
(A3)  8 B/aD 12_a(p-pA)f''-(8pA/ODi)
which  is  negative  when  the  second  term  on the  RHS  is  either  negative,
or  positive  and  small  enough.  To see  when  that  occurs,  consider:
(A4)  8p  /8D 1- (PAe/aIA)(aIA/ 8D,)
where  IA  is income  evaluated  at the  autarkic  price  p. The  expression
in (A4)  is  zero  with  homothetic  preferences.  It is  negative  when the
19  where  VT is the  indirect  utility  function  under  the  trade  mode.-33-
first  good  becomes  relatively  less  desirable  with  higher  income.
2.b.  Comparative  statics.
In  all  cases,  we focus  on the  move of  the  function  B(.)  in (7).  (Al)
insures  that  DmAx  moves  in the  same  direction  (also,  see  figure  1).
(A5)  WB/Ua  - pf'K-g'K-(aE/aUA)[U,f'K-UMg'K]
- pf'K-g'K [pAfIK-ggKl
- (p-p)f'K>O
(A6) a2B/a 2- (p-p)K2fIe-(apA/OIA)(aIA/aa)fDK<O  with homothetic
preferences.
(A7) OB/ap-  X-(aE/ap)  - X-x  >0  since  X is  exported
(AB)  2  B/ap2- -ax/ap  >0
(A9) aDMX/aR!_  _B/  (R!)  2 <0
(A10)  aB/aKP-OB/aD  >0
3.  Choice  of the  optimal  investment  mix (a).
3.a.  Determination  of aA:
aA  minimizes  B in (7).  Using  (A5),  the  first  order  condition  is given
by pA_p.  An interior  solution  is guaranteed  by the  convexity  of the
indifference curves. At a-aA,  equation (7) implies that B(aA,p,K)-O
for  all  p and  K because  U (a  )-UT(aA).-34-
3.b. Determination  of  aF:  See  section  II.5  and  equation  (10).
3.b.  Local  extrema.
The  solutions  (D 1*,a*)  solve  the  first  order  conditions  of the
maximization  of NI  under (1)  to (7).  These  are:
(A6)  aI/aDl*  - RF >0  if  D*-D1mx (liquidity  constrained  solution)
-O  otherwise  (liquidity  unconstrained  (LU))
(A7)  a(I-R)/da*  -0
Proposition:  Local  extrema.
(1)  In the  liquidity  unconstrained  (LU)  solution,  a* aF
(2)  In  the  liquidity  constrained  solution,  a*oap.  In  particular:
aA<a*<aF  iif  D1 AX>O  (EP  strategy)
and  aF<a*<l  iif  D1"A-0  (IS  strategy)
Proof. -
Using (6),  and (8),  rewrite  (A7)  as:
(A8) a(I-R)/aa*-(aI/aa*)-O  if  LU
(A9) a(I-R)/aa*-(8I/aa*)+[(aI/OK)-RF]  (aDml/aa)-O  if  D 1
1 X>O
(AlO)  a(I-R)/aa*-(aI/aa*)-Re  (aD'M/aa)-O  if  D1 -0
In the  liquidity  unconstrained  case,  the  FOC  is  given  by (A8):  a*
must  maximize  income  and  thus  a*-ap.  This  proves  (1).  When the  credit-35-
ceiling  is  binding,  either  D1Ax>O  or it  is zero.  In  the  first  case,
the  FOC  is given  by (A9):  the  RHS  term  is  positive  by (A5)  and  (A6).
Thus,  the  LHS  must  be negative,  implying  that  a*  must  be above  aF  (EP
strategy).  In the  second  case,  given  by (A10),  equation  (A5)  implies
that  the  LHS  must  be positive  at the  optimum;  thus,  a* must  be below
ap  (IS  strategy).
3.d.  Comparative  statics:  Changes  in  Do
(i)  LU and  IS cases:  from (A8)  and  (AIO),  it is  easy  to  verify  that
(Ba*/8D,)-O.  Moreover,  [8(I-R)/8DO]  is  equal  to -R in the  first  case
(since  R-DoRe)  and  to 0 in  the  second.
(ii)  EP  case:  Using  the  envelop  theorem  and  the  fact  that  R-B,  we
have [3(I-R)/8DO]--8I/8K<O.  The sign  of (Ba*/aDO)  is indeterminate.
3.e.  Comparative  statics:  Changes  in  p
(i)  LU case:  the  envelop  theorem  implies  that  8(I-R)/8p-X
(ii)  IS case:  The  envelop  theorem  imply  that
8(I-R)/ap-8I/8p-8B/8p-x>O.  Moreover,  the  implicit  function  theorem
and (AlO)  imply  that
sign[8a*/ap]-sign[O 2I/8aap_8 2B/8aap]-sign[f'K-f'K]-O.
(iii)  EP case:  By the  envelop  theorem,
8(I-R)/ap-  8I/ap  +(8I/aK)(aD"/8p)-x+(X-x)8I/8K>x  using  (A6).
Moreover,  the  implicit  function  theorem  applied  on (A9)  leads  to:
sign(aa*/ap)-sign[8 2I/Oa*ap  +82D  /M  a8p(aI/8K-Re)+aD  Oa*.fI]>O
Note that  (I-R)  is  affected  more in  the  LI and  EP cases  than  in the-36-
IS case.  Thus,  a large  enough  drop  in  p leads  to  an IS global
optimum.
3.f  Comparative  statics:  changes  in  KD
In all  cases,  the  change  in a* is indeterminate  and  depends  on the
relative  change  in the  marginal  productivities  of the  two  sectors.
Using  the  envelop  theorem,  we can  show  that:
(i)  LU case:  aI-R/aKP-8I/aK
(ii)  IS case:  aI-R/OKD-8I/aK-BB/aK
(iii)  EP case:  aI-R/IK  -8I/aK+[aI/aK-Re]aDl/8K
It is  easy  to  verify  that  net  income  is  more  affected  in the  EP case,
followed  by LU and  IS.  Thus,  a large  enough  drop  in  KD  makes  IS
globally  optimal.-37-
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